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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot' refined the

*
J.D., May 2000, American University Washington College of Law; B.A. with Honors, 1997,
Political Science and Spanish, University of Wisconsin - Madison. The author would like to thank
Professor Robert Vaughn for his ability to explain arcane aspects of civil procedure, and his insightful
comments on earlier drafts. The author also thanks the American University International Law Review staff
for their editing and support. Special thanks to the two counsels of record in Altai's Petition for Certiorari,
Susan G. Braden of Baker & McKenzie, Washington, D.C.,and Stephen D. Kahn of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, LLP, New York, N.Y., for their comments and research assistance.
1
159 U.S. 113 (1895) (involving an action to recover business losses that failed in French court).
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definition and application of international comity2 regarding the recognition
of foreign judgments by United States courts In a landmark ruling, the Court
found that foreign judgments rendered by a competent foreign court areprima
facie evidence of the truth of the matter adjudged, but are not conclusive and
worthy of the full faith and credit of United States courts 4 absent a reciprocity
agreement' between the nations.
Since Hilton v. Guyot, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have
applied varying levels of adherence and interest to the doctrines of
international comity and reciprocity.6 In the area of foreign antisuit
injunctions,' United States federal courts have balanced international comity
2

See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (stating that comity is neither an absolute

obligation, nor mere courtesy, but rather the recognition by one nation of the acts of another nation); see
also Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (defining
comity as the "recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the legislative, executive,
orjudicial acts of another"). The court elaborated further that comity is an ideal with more force than mere
courtesy and accommodation, but demonstrates a respect to foreign acts that should be withheld only when
their acceptance would be contrary to domestic public policy or interests. See id. The doctrine began in
the Seventeenth Century as theorists began to reconcile "emerging notions of absolute sovereignty within
national boundaries" with the practice of applying foreign law to certain domestic cases. See Brian Pearce,
The Comity Doctrine as a Barrierto JudicialJurisdiction:A U.S.-E. U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. IN'L L
525, 526 (1994) (comparing notions of comity among Member States of the EU and the United States).
The solution to the dilemma became the ideal that nations should mutually "recognize rights acquired under
the laws of another state," unless such recognition was against the law or public policy. Id. quotingfrom
Ernst G. Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflict Legum, 13 ILLLREv. 375, 378 (1919).
3
See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 205-206 (discussing the effect of foreign judgments on United States
courts).
4
See id.at 227 (ruling that international comity, absent a treaty with France or statutory authority
recognizing French decisions as conclusive, does not require that United States courts grant French
decisions full faith and credit).
5
See id. at 210-28 (discussing how Europe and the Americas have generally accepted the rule of
reciprocity). The doctrine of reciprocity raises the standard of respect and enforceability of foreignjudicial
decisions through bilateral agreement from comity, which is the equivalent of a primafacie level of
deference, to a level of conclusiveness and resjudicata. See id at 205-206. Irrespective of reciprocity, the
Court emphasized that the chief concern with the enforcement of foreign judgments is the assurance that
the parties have had a fair and impartial trial. See id at 205-206 (stating that fraud and prejudice are two
grounds for impeaching foreign judgment).
6
See Steven R. Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: InternationalComity and
Antisuit Injunctions, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L & ECoN. 1, 12-31 (1996) (illuminating a wide spectrum
of rationale to supersede or respect international comity in both conservative and liberal circuits).
7
See Richard W. Raushenbush, Antisuit Injunctionsand InternationalComity, 71 VA. L REV.
1039, 1040 (1985) (defining an antisuit injunction as a court order upon a party subject to the issuing
court's jurisdiction that prohibits or conditions the maintenance of a suit in another court). The moving
party requests an antisuit injunction from the court when the party feels that its interests are better served
in a United States court or that the foreign litigation is simply too costly, unnecessary, and inconvenient.
See generally Teresa D. Baer, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad: Towards a
TransnationalApproach, 37 STAN. L REV. 155 (1984) (discussing the circumstances of the request for an
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with the concerns of parties under its jurisdiction' in two distinct manners.9
All federal courts must first determine whether they have jurisdiction over the
parties.' 0 Second, they must determine whether the parties and issues are the
same in both the American and foreign actions so that resolving one action
will dispose of the other." The federal circuits, however, have developed
"conservative" and "liberal" standards to use in the final determination of
whether the facts of the case justify the issuance of an antisuit injunction.
The conservative group, composed of the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Second, Third, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits, favors
international comity over the courts' equitable power to issue antisuit
injunctions.' These circuits require the movant to demonstrate that an
injunction is necessary to protect the forum's 3 jurisdiction, or to prevent

antisuit injunction). United States courts generally respect the issuance of antisuit injunctions by other
United States courts, but will probably not enforce one that is against the forum's important public or
regulatory policies. See Raushenbush, supra note 7, at 1054.
The federal courts may also accomplish the goal of the foreign antisuit injunction - prevention
of the initiation or continuance of litigation abroad - under the doctrines offorum non conveniens, and lis
alibi pendens. See generally, Yoshimasa Furuta, International Parallel Litigation: Disposition of
Duplicative Civil Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 5 PAc. RIM L & POL'Y J. 1, 9-18 (1995).
Under forum non conveniens, a court may decline jurisdiction when it deems itself to be a seriously
inconvenient forum and an adequate alternative forum exists. See id at 9 (applying Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)). The Gulf Oil Corp. court articulated a balance between the private and
public interests involved. When the private interests of the parties outweighed the public interests of the
United States, a dismissal underforum non conveniens was appropriate. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at
508-509. In PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the Court extended the use offorum non
conveniens in the international context by lowering the threshold for dismissal to a showing by a party that
an alternative forum is the "most suitable" and by attaching a presumption of convenience for the foreign
party to the alternative forum. See PiperAircraftCo., 454 U.S. at 256. The Latin phrase lis alibi pendens
means "a suit pending elsewhere." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 931 (6th ed. 1991). Under the common
law, this doctrine allows a federal court to stay its proceeding in favor of a foreign parallel litigation, thereby
conserving judicial and litigant expense. See Furuta, supra, at 16. Ideally, the federal court stays the
proceeding until the foreign action reaches final judgment, whereupon the federal court recognizes it as res
judicata in full or in part. See id. If matters between the parties remain unadjudicated, the federal court
revives its proceeding. See id
s
See infra notes 13,17 and accompanying text (defining "forun"and "jurisdiction" over parties).
9
See Baer, supranote7, at 157-59 (illuminating the two tests that American courts use to issue
foreign antisuit injunctions).
10
See id. at 158.
i1
See id. (illuminating the preliminary determinations made by the court before considering
whether to issue an antisuit injunction).
12
See id. at 159 quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 664 F. 2d 660(8th Cir. 1981)
(stating that "the question is whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the
court to intervene").
13
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 452 (6th ed. 1991) (defining "forum" as a court of justice,
judicial tribunal, and place of litigation, administrative body, and jurisdiction).
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evasion of the important public policies of the forum. 4 These circuits thereby
elevate the doctrine of international comity to the virtual exclusion of all other
considerations."
The liberal group, containing the United States Courts of Appeals for the
First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, employs a more flexible test that
justifies an injunction when duplication of the parties and issues raise
equitable concerns.' 6 These courts use a four-prong test and may enjoin a
party from proceeding with a foreign action that is 1) against the public policy
of the forum issuing the injunction; 2) vexatious or oppressive; 3) threatening
to the issuing court's in rem17 or quasi in rem"8 jurisdiction; or 4) prejudicial
to other equitable considerations. 9 These circuits emphasize the traditional
See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong,837 F.2d 33,36 (2d Cir. 1987) ("China
Trade") (reversing the issuance of a foreign antisuit injunction lacking additional justification besides
similarity in parties and issues); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981) (reversing an injunction where duplication of issues and insurer's delay were sole
bases for its issuance); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1358 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that international comity precludes issuance ofantisuit injunction absent a threat to the court's jurisdiction
or evasion of important public policies); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Laker Airways") (issuing a foreign antisuit injunction only to "prevent an
irreparable miscarriage of justice," such as protecting the court's jurisdiction or policies). The Eleventh
Circuit has not ruled on this issue, but appears to lean toward the conservative standard. See Mutual Serv.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 919, 923-24 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (adopting view that only
showing of threat to court's jurisdiction or important public policies is grounds for issuance of foreign
antisuit injunction).
is
See Raushenbush, supranote 7,at 1051 (explaining that the "conservative" approach to antisuit
injunctions prohibits their issue without a showing of threat to jurisdiction or evasion of the public policies
of the forum).
16
See Baer, supranote 7, at 159 (stating that after the proponent meets the two-prong threshold
test, any showing of vexation, duplication of litigation, delay, inconvenience, or possibility of inconsistent
rulings is enough to issue an injunction).
17
See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 545 (6th ed. 1991) (pertaining to the court's jurisdiction over
"a thing possessed"). Conversely, in personamjurisdiction involves the court asserting jurisdiction over
the defendant personally and not the subject of the dispute between the parties. See id. at 544 (defining "in
personam" as the jurisdiction or power that court may acquire over the party).
It is unclear whether in personamjurisdiction is sufficient or whether in remjurisdiction is also
needed, or separately sufficient, before a United States federal court will entertain the question of issuing
an antisuit injunction. Compare Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d
852, 855 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding in personamjurisdiction over the parties sufficient), and LakerAirways,
731 F.2d at 924 (issuing antisuit injunction to protect the court's valid jurisdiction over parties), with
Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that court has power to enjoin
persons connected with its in rem jurisdiction), and China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36 (stating that antisuit
injunction may be appropriate in both in rem and in personamproceedings).
Is
See ChinaTrade, 837 F.2d at 36 (defining "quasi in rem" as "[a]n action in which the basis of
jurisdiction is the defendant's interest in property, real or personal, which is within the court's power...").
19
See Canadian Filters, Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578-79 (1st Cir. 1969) (stating
that comity must give way when the forum seeks to enforce its own substantial interests, or when
14

1999]

FOREIGNANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS

equitable power of the court to enjoin a person within its jurisdiction from
litigating abroad.2" Comity, arguably, is set aside in the interests of the
parties. 2
As our nation moves into the global economy, it must overcome the
isolationist tendency and re-tool in order to compete. 22 Moreover, it must also
confront the issues and problems with a developing global legal system.23
The existence of two distinct standards used in determining when a foreign
antisuit injunction should override comity provides a level of uncertainty to
international business transactions.24
International commerce depends on the ability of merchants to predict the
likely consequences of their conduct in overseas markets.25 Predictability
26
depends in part on the level of cooperation and reciprocity between nations,
but manifests itself primarily from reliance upon an established legal standard
that is not a surprise to any party. 27 The divided standard for determining the

relitigation would cover exactly the same points, both suits are in rem, and the burden of a second suit thus
renders reliance on res judicata alone inappropriate); Kaepa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 627 (declining to "require a
district court to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every time that it must decide
whether to enjoin a foreign action"); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("Allendale") (expressing the circuit's adherence to a "lax," or liberal standard, which allows
injunction of second litigation that would be vexatious or oppressive); Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc.
v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981). The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not
ruled on this issue, but appear to align themselves with the liberal standard. See United Cigarette Mach.
Co. v. Wright, 156 F. 244, 245 (E.D.N.C. 1907) (declaring that courts of equity can restrain litigants in a
foreign state or country when the matter is already fully litigated in the court determining injunctive relief);
Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Minn. 1982) (applying twoprong similarity threshold and criteria). The Tenth Circuit has also not ruled on the issue of foreign antisuit
injunctions, nor provided any caselaw that indicates which standard it even implicitly favors. See generally
Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Propriety of FederalCourt Injunction Against Suit in Foreign Country,

78 A.L.R. FED. 831 (Supp. 1998) (delineating caselaw of all federal circuits that have reviewed and/or ruled
on the issue of foreign antisuit injunctions, with the notable absence of the Tenth Circuit).
2
See Raushenbush, supra note 7, at 1049 (elaborating on the basis for the "liberal" approach to
antisuit injunctions).
21

See Markus Lenenbach, Antisuit Injunctionsin England, Germany, and the United States: Their

Treatment Under European Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention, 20 LOY. LA. INT'L & COMP. LJ.

257, 261 (1998) (explaining how liberal jurisdictions view comity in light of interests of litigants).
n

See Michael David Schimek, Antisuit and Anti-antisuit Injunctions: A Proposed Texas

Approach, 45 BAYLOR L REV 499 (1993) (discussing economic situation of the United States).
2
See Swanson, supra note 6, at I (discussing the division in the circuits on when to issue a
foreign antisuit injunctions).
2

See Gau Shan Co., Ld. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F. 2d 1349,1355 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing

the effects of inappropriate use of antisuit injunctions).
25
See id.; see also Raushenbush, supra note 7, at 1039 (stating that the interdependence of the
international economic system ensures the extraterritorial application of each nation's laws).
26
See Gau ShanCo., 956 F.2d at 1355 (stating value of predictability in international commerce).
2

See Julie E. Dowler, Forging Finality: Searchingfora Solution to the International Double-suit
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issuance of foreign antisuit injunctions exacerbates the problem by making
cooperation and reciprocity between courts of different nations less likely.2"
The United States Supreme Court has had the opportunity to address the
division in the circuits and articulate a uniform standard several times in the
past twenty years. 29 As recently illustrated in ComputerAssocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc.,3" however, the Court continues to decline this opportunity by
denying certiorari to appropriate cases.
This Comment presents the Altai cases and, from the issues raised in
Altai' s petition for certiorari, determines why the Court should have taken the
opportunity to eliminate the division in the circuits. Part H presents the Altai
cases in the United States and France, thereby explaining Altai's arguments
and the principles of res judicata3" and international comity. In particular,
Part II demonstrates how these principles are understood and applied in
France, the European Community ("EC"), and other principal trade partners
of the United States. Part HI illuminates the standards used in the two groups
of United States circuit courts and their repercussions on international
business and litigants. Part IV recommends that the United States Supreme
Court should adopt a uniform standard that flexibly employs the doctrine of
international comity, while adequately responding to the needs of United
States members of the global economy by limiting litigation in areas of
"global" law.

Dilemma, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L 363, 365 (1994) (stating that litigants must know that they can rely

on the judicial system of the country in which it does business to follow consistently the international policy
and rationale set by the country's legislative and executive branches). Due to its unpredictable nature and
negative effect on international business, protective judicial procedures, e.g., antisuit injunctions, should
be eliminated in order to prevent international businesses' dissatisfaction with the legal relief available from
the United States, which arguably forces them to turn away from its market. See id.
2B
See Gau Shan Co., 956 F.2d at 1355 (noting negative effect of the unpredictable issuance of
foreign antisuit injunctions).
29
See, e.g., Northwest Sports Enters., Ltd. v. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc., 457 U.S. 1105
(1982) (denying cert.); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 457 U.S.
1105 (1982) (denying cert.); Achilles Corp. v. Kaepa, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 77 (1996) (denying cert.); Altai, Inc.
v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 1106 (1998) (denying cert.).
30
126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A ltai
V?') (affirming denial of antisuit injunction), cert.denied,
523 U.S. 1106 (1998).
31
See BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 1305 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining resjudicata as a rule that "a final
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction... is conclusive as to the rights of the parties,"

thereby constituting an absolute bar to its subsequent litigation).
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H. COMPUTERASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. ALTAI, INC.

Computer Associates International, Inc. ("CA")32 and Altai, Inc.
("Altai")33 were involved in a total of seven different legal proceedings,
spanning ten years and continuing. The first five proceedings, Altai I through
Altai V, comprise the original copyright infringement action.' The final two,
Altai VI and Altai VII, pertain to Altai's request for a foreign antisuit
injunction."
A. The United States Copyright InfringementAction
In 1988, CA brought a copyright infringement36 suit against Altai alleging

32

See ComputerAssociates: About CA, (visited Sept. 29,1998) <httpJ/www.cai.com/about.htm>

(providing general information about corporation). CA, with its headquarters in Islandia, NY, is a world
leader in mission-critical business software - developing, licensing, and supporting over 500 products. See
Id. (employing over 11,000 people in over forty-three countries, with revenue of $4.7 billion its last fiscal

year).
3
See Tsu-Man Peter Tu, Copyright - Computer Software Copyright Infringement--Three-step
Testfor SubstantialSimilarity, Involving Abstraction,Filtration,and Comparison,Should be Applied in
DeterminingWhether ComputerSoftware Copyrighthas been Infringed- Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.1992), 25 SETON HA.L L REv. 412, n.24 (describing Altai as a Texas

corporation doing business in Arlington, Texas, that designs, develops, and markets computer software
packages that run on a variety of computer hardware platforms).
M' See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 544,560-62 (E.D.N.Y. 199 1)("Altai
T') (holding that Altai's OSCAR 3.4 infringed CA's copyright, but OSCAR 3.5 did not); Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715-20 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Altai I1") (affirmed Altai rs ruling, but
vacated preemption holding); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 50, 54 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) ("Altai il")(holding on remand that trade secret claim was barred under Texas's two-year statute
of limitations); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai. Inc., 22 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Altai IV")
(certifying issue of statute of limitations to the Texas Supreme Court); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 61 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("Altai V") (affirming District Court's decision to dismiss
CA's trade secret claim).
3
See Computer Assocs. Int'l. Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 48,54 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Altai Vr)
(denying Altai's motion to enjoin CA from pursuing French action); Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 372 (affirming
Altai Vrs denial of injunction).
36
See generally Andrew 0. Isztwan, Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.: Protecting
the Structure of Computer Software in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L REV. 423, 423-24 (1993)

(describing evolution of copyright protection for computers and computer software); Tu, supra note 33, at
414-418 (showing progression of case law regarding copyright protection of computer software); Dennis
M. McCarthy, CopyrightInfringement- Redefining the Scope of Protection CopyrightAffords the Non-

LiteralElements of a ComputerProgram-Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693 (2d Cir. 1992). 66 TEMPLE L REV. 273, 273-74 (1993) (providing concise evolution of copyright
protection for computer programs).
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that Altai copied substantial portions of CA's SCHEDULER37 computer
program into Altai's OSCAR 3.43" program.39 After CA brought suit, Altai
rewrote parts of OSCAR 3.4 and marketed OSCAR 3.5.' In response, CA
amended its complaint to include a claim that OSCAR 3.5 infringed CA's
copyright to its ADAPTER4' program.42

The court in Altai // rejected prior authority and adopted a three-prong test of "abstraction,
filtration, and comparison" in order to determine whether a specific computer program is "substantially
similar" and thereby infringes the copyright of another program. Altai 11, 982 F.2d at 711-714. The
application of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test and an analysis of specifically how the Second
Circuit found that OSCAR 3.4 did infringe CA's copyright to SCHEDULER and how OSCAR 3.5 did not,
is beyond the scope of this Comment. The test is important, however, to illustrate how the United States
and the common law address copyright infringement.
Pursuant to the common-law tradition, copyright protection began under the common law, has
since been codified, and subsequently has grown from the original codification. The Copyright Act of 1976
provides the base for all copyright enforcement of computer programs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010(1988
& Supp. V 1994). "A work may be copyrighted if it is an original 'work of authorship' fixed in a tangible
medium ofexpression from which it can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated." Tu, supra
note 33, at 421-422 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
InBakerv. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,103 (1879), the Court articulated an idea-expression distinction
to copyright protection. The Baker rule provides that copyright protection is limited to the means of
expressing an idea and is not applicable to the underlying ideas. See id. at 102-103. The Copyright Act
of 1976 followed Baker by declaring that copyright protection covers expression, but does not extend to
any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle[,J or discovery." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
Copyright law protects all works in tangible medium of expression by granting equitable relief
to copyright holders against all works "substantially similar." MELVIILE B. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (1980). To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove
ownership of the copyright and copying by the alleged infringer. See id. Since there is often no direct
evidence of copying, the plaintiff ordinarily establishes it by proving access to the copyrighted material and
substantial similarity between the two works. See id. § 13.01(B); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying two-prong test as articulated in NPMMER ON
COPYRIGHT). Now, after Altai 11, the Second Circuit employs the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to
determine when a work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work and therefore demands equitable
relief to the copyright holder. See Altai 11,982 F.2d at 714. Copyright protection under French and EC law
is distinct in application, but similar to United States law in theory and purpose. See discussion infra note
48 (elaborating on French and EC copyright protection).
37
See Sue Mota, Computer Associates v. Altai - French ComputerSoftware CopyrightAction
Not Barred By U.S. Decision, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, n.8 (Fall 1997)
<http:/joumal.law.ufl.edu/-techlaw/3-1/mota.html> (describing SCHEDULER as a job-scheduing
program with three different operating systems for IBM mainframe computers).
39
See id. (describing OSCAR as an operating system compatibility component, developed for use
with Altai's ZEKE program).
39
See Altai 1, 775 F. Supp. at 549, 552-53.
40
See Altai VI. 950 F. Supp. at 49.
"
See Mota, supra note 37, at n.8 (describing ADAPTER as an operating system compatibility
component that connects CA's SCHEDULER with three different operating systems).
42
See id.
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In 1991, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York found in Altai I that OSCAR 3.4 infringed CA's United States copyright
to SCHEDULER, but held that OSCAR 3.5 was not substantially similar to
CA's ADAPTER program.43 The court awarded CA $364,444 in actual
damages plus pre-judgment interest. 44 The Second Circuit affirmed in Altai
II, but vacated the district court's holding that federal copyright law preempts
Texas law regarding trade secret claims.45 In 1995, after consultation with the
Texas Supreme Court, the Second Circuit affirmed in Altai V the district
court's dismissal of CA's trade secret claim, ruling that Texas's two-year
statute of limitations applied and barred CA's claim.'
B. The French Copyright Infringement Action
On February 15, 1990, before Altai I went to trial in the United States, CA
and L'Agence pour la Protection des Programmes ("L'Agence")47 filed a
copyright infringement action" in the Tribunal de Commerce of Bobigny,
France ("Commercial Court"),49 against Altai and its French distributor, La
Societe FASTER, S.A.R.L. ("FASTER").50 In the complaint, CA and
L'Agence alleged that Altai's importation and FASTER's distribution of
OSCAR 3.5 violated CA' s French copyright.5' CA obtained French copyright

43
"

45
4
47

See Altai 1, 775 F. Supp. at 560-62.
See id. at 560-61, 571-73.
See Altai 11, 982 F.2d at 715-20.
See Altai V, 61 F.3d at 8.
See Mota, supranote 37, para. 9 (stating that L'Agence pourla Protectiondes Programmesis

a non-profit, private, professional society representing the interests of authors and copyright owners of
computer programs).
49
See T. Com. Bobigny, 7e civ., Jan. 20, 1995, 90/02131 at 7 (Ff.) ("Bobigny") (unpublished
decision), translatedin Brief in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 189, Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998) (denying cert.) [hereinafter Altai Petition for Certiorari] (identifying the
circumstances preceding CA's and L'Agence's filing against Altai and FASTER); Altai VI, 950 F. Supp.
at 50 (noting the circumstances of litigation against Altai and FASTER). The EC Council Directive on the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs ensures and harmonizes copyright protection of computer programs
among the Member States of the EC. See Council Directive 91/250, art. 1, para. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42,
44 [hereinafter Computer Directive] (declaring that "Member States shall protect computer programs, by
copyright, as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention").
49
See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. at 50, n.4 (describing the Commercial Court as a court of limited
jurisdiction over civil disputes between parties with commercial status or for acts that are commercial in

nature).
so
See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. at 50 (stating that FASTER was a French company, owned by a Dutch
concern, which distributed software containing OSCAR 3.5).
51
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 7, translatedin Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
189; Altai VI, 950 F. Supp at 50.
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protection by and through the Universal Copyright Convention of Geneva 2
a.nd the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works."
The United States and France, as signatories to both conventions, entitle
foreign works of other Member States to national treatment.'
On October 1, 1991, Altai alerted the Commercial Court that the United
States court in Altai I had found that Altai's OSCAR 3.5 did not violate CA's
United States copyright to ADAPTER. 5 In light of CA's pending appeal to
the Second Circuit, the Commercial Court postponed the trial until September
10, 1992.56 On September 10, 1992, Altai requested a stay of the French trial
until the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris57 ruled on Altai's request for an
exequatur,8 which would allow Altai to introduce the affirmed judgment of
s2
53

Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, (as amended July 24, 1971), 25 U.S.T. 1341.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act 1971), S. TREATY

DOC. No. 27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Computer Directive follows
the Berne Convention in that it leaves substantive decisions about how to judge copyright infringement
claims to its Member States, subject only to the rule of national treatment. Accord id.at arts. 5-6; Computer
Directive, supra note 48, at art. 1, para. 2 (stating that ideas and principles that underlie any element of a
computer program, including those that underlie its interfaces, are not protected under the Computer
Directive).
54
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 15, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
197 (explaining the sections of the Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention that entitle
national treatment to foreign works of all Member States); Altal VI, 950 F. Supp at 50 (noting that the
Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention require national treatment of foreign works of
the signatories). As signatories to the conventions, France and the United States recognize each other's
grant of copyright protection as conclusive. See Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 52, art. I,
25 U.S.T. at 1343; Berne Convention, supra note 53, art. V(I), 828 U.N.T.S. at 226; see also Berne
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
ss
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 10, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
192 (noting Altai's pre-trial petitions); accordAltai VII, 126 F.3d at 368.
s6
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 9, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
191 (stating that CA and Altai consented to the postponement of French proceeding); Altai VII, 126 F.3d
at 368 (noting that CA and Altai consented to the postponement of the French action).
57
Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at n.5 (defining the Tribunal de Grand Instance as
a regional French court of general civil jurisdiction, benched by professional jurists).
58
See Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at n.10, (defining the oronnance d'exequatur
as the legal process by which foreign judgments are given res judicata effect and rendered enforceable in
France). In order to grant the exequatur, the French court must determine that: 1) the rendering court had

jurisdiction and the French courts did not have exclusivejurisdiction; 2) the foreign procedure was regular;
3) the foreign court applied law that was substantially equivalent to French law or would have been
applicable under French conflict of laws rules; 4) the foreign judgment is not against French public policy;
and 5) there was no evasion of mandatory rules of law. See RESTATEMENT (TrIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 481 reporter's note 6(c) (1987); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The French Fxequatur
Proceeding: The Exorbitant Jurisdictional Rules ofArticles 14 and 15 (Code Civil) as Obstacles to the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in France, 2 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L REV. 307 (1979) (analyzing
the difficulty of obtaining res judicata for United States final judgments in French courts). See generally
Russel J. Weintraub, How Substantial is our Needfor a Judgments-recognition Convention and What
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Altai I in the Commercial Court. 9 The Commercial Court issued the stay on
October 22, 1992'° and the Tribunal de Grande Instance issued the exequatur
on June 21, 1993.61
The French trial resumed on November 25, 1994' and on January 20,
1995, the Commercial Court found that Altai's OSCAR 3.5 did not violate
CA's rights under French copyright law.6" As relief for L'Agence's seizure
of FASTER's products using OSCAR 3.5, the Commercial Court awarded
Altai 100,000 francs. 64
Altai prevailed, despite unsuccessfully arguing that Altai I controlled the
French trial under the doctrine of res judicata. 6' The Commercial Court

Should we Bargain Away to Get it?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L 167. n.101 (1998) (elaborating that the
exequatur process "differ[s] from country to country and can be onerous"); Jorge A. Vargas, Enforcement
of Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Mexico, 5 U.S.-MX. L. 137, 147 (1997) (stating that even when
a proponent complies with all conditions for issuance of an exequatur, there is no guarantee that the foreign
judgment will be enforced).
59
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 11, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
193 (noting Altai's pre-trial motions to the Commercial Court); Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 368 (stating Altai's
pre-trial petitions to the Commercial Court).
W
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 11, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48. app. at
193 (elaborating on Altai's requests to the Commercial Court); Alta VII, 126 F.3d at 368 (noting that Altai
requested a stay of the French proceeding).
6
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 12, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
194 (stating that the issuance of the exequatur by the Tribunal de Grand Instance made the decision in Altai
H enforceable in France); accord Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 368.
62
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 13, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
195 (stating that the Commercial Court based its decision on the facts as reported in the United States
rulings); accord Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 368.
63
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 30-3 1, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app.
at 212-13 (holding that OSCAR 3.5 did not infringe CA's copyright to ADAPTER because the source codes
to both programs were different, the architecture and organization of the programs had similarities dictated
by constraining logic, and the interfaces of computer programs were not subject to protection); accordAlta
VII, 126 F.3d at 368.
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 31, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
213 (noting negative business impact that CA's suit had upon FASTER, who entered liquidation on
September 25, 1990, and awarding damages to Altai as compensation for business losses); see also Mota,
supra note 37, para. 14 (discussing the judgment rendered by the Commercial Court for Altai in 1995).
65
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 24, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
206 (rejecting Altai's res judicata argument because the French proceeding saw the addition of L'Agence
and FASTER who were not involved in the United States proceeding); Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 368 (rejecting
res judicata due to dissimilarity of issues and parties). Pursuant to Article 1351 of the French Civil Code.
res judicata applies to a claim when a previous judgment involved the same claim, the same cause, and the
same parties. See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 23-24, translated in Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48,
app. at 205-206 (citing C. civ. art. 1351 (Fr.)).
The French and EC doctrines of res judicata are controlled by the Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, July 28, 1990,33 0. J. (C 189) 1, 134 [hereinafter EC Convention on Jurisdiction]. The EC encounters parallel litigation frequently and, in
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justified its rejection of res judicata because neither the parties, nor the
French and United States bodies of copyright law were identical." The
Commercial Court rejected Altai's argument that the exequatur effectively
made Altai 11 control the French decision, stating that software protection
jurisprudence in the United States and France is so unsettled that the courts
must consider each case individually.6'
order to adequately support its ideal of free circulation of goods and persons, adheres to the "first-filed
rule." See EC Convention on Jurisdiction, arts. 21-23, 33 O. J. at 10-11. Where proceedings involving the
same cause of action and parties are brought in different Contracting States, the first court to obtain
jurisdiction hears the case, and all other courts are bound to decline jurisdiction. See id., art. 21. If the
proceedings are "related [and] are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments from separate proceedings," all courts after the firstfiled court may stay their proceedings or decline jurisdiction. Id., art. 22.
The EC Convention on Jurisdiction negates the necessity of the EC and its Member States to
promulgate their own antisuit injunction procedure or allow its development through decisions by the
European Court of Justice. See id, arts. 21-23. While some Member States developed the antisuit
injunction procedure before the inception of the EC, the majority of the Member States that adhere to the
civil law tradition do not employ it. See Markus Lenenbach, Antisuit Injunctions in England, Germany,
and the United States: Their Treatment Under EuropeanCivil Procedureand the HagueConvention, 20
LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 257, 259 (stating that in 1996, the German judicial system first deliberated
the legal effect of an English antisuit injunction against a German party from continuing a pending German
lawsuit). Unlike English and American courts, German courts have no equitable power and, therefore, may
not decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens or deny the action by an antisuit
injunction. See id. at 272 (noting that jurisdictional rules in Germany are mandatory and that judges may
not deviate from rules even if the procedural rules produce an unjust outcome). Germany, through the
power of the forum selection clause and the statutory decree that the plaintiffs bear the defendants'
economic burden when a court without proper jurisdiction hears the case, has no need for a foreign antisuit
injunction. See id. at 282 (explaining that international comity is a common law tradition that has no
equivalent in Germany or other civil law countries). English courts, however, liberally issue foreign antisuit
injunctions under equity where the English court must intervene to protect injustice). See id. at 267 (noting
that the 1981 Supreme Court Act empowers English courts to issue an injunction "in all cases in which it
appears to the court to be just and convenient"); Sup. CL Act, 1981, 37 (Eng.).
6
See Bobigny, 90/02131 at 24, translatedin Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, app. at
206 (rejecting Altai's res judicata argument); accordAltai VII, 126 F.3d at 368.
67
See Bobigny, 90/0213 1 at 24, translatedin Altai Petition for Certiorari, supranote 48, app. at
206 (stating that even if United States copyright law is close to French law it "cannot be completely and
immediately identified with French law without an analysis of the facts under French law"); accord Altai
VII, 126 F.3d at 368. This dicta hails to the Hilton court's essential statement that international comity,
absent an explicit treaty recognizing judgments of the foreign country in question, does not equate the level
of resjudicata. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,227 (1895) (commenting on the doctrine of reciprocity).
The Commercial Court's rejection of Altai's attempt to use the exequaturmade the arduous pre-trial proceedings to obtain the exequatur from the Tribunal de Grand Instance and stay the proceeding in the Commercial Court completely a waste oftime. See discussionsupranote 58 (defining exequaturandexplaining
how a party obtains the order). The Commercial Court acted within its discretion, however, because the
Tribunal de Grand Instance allowed the trial court to determine the exequatur's"incidence on the outcome
of the proceedings before it." CA Paris, 4e ch., Oct. 23, 1998, 95/14189 at 4 (Fr.) ("CA Paris")
(unpublished decision) (presenting progression of the CA's copyright infringement claim in France).
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CA appealed the Commercial Court's decision to the Cour d'appel de
Paris ("Paris Court of Appeals")" on April 25, 1995.69 The Paris Court of
Appeals received briefs on May 13, 1998, and heard oral argument from the
parties on June 18, 1998.70 The Paris Court of Appeals first affirmed the
Commercial Court's finding that the addition of FASTER to the French
proceeding and the difference between United States and French copyright
law precluded Altai' s exequaturfrom controlling the French proceeding as res
judicata. 7' Second, the Paris Court of Appeals found that CA failed to show
that there was another means of writing the source codes at Altai's disposal
when it designed OSCAR 3.5.72 Therefore, the Paris Court of Appeals
affirmed that OSCAR 3.5 did not infringe CA's copyright to ADAPTER."
C. Altai's Motion for Antisuit Injunction
On November 16, 1994, Altai requested that the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York enjoin CA from litigating its
French claim of copyright infringement, only to voluntarily withdraw the
request because the Commercial Court ruled for Altai in 1995.' 4 Upon CA's
appeal of the Commercial Court's decision to the Paris Court of Appeals,
however, Altai reactivated its motion to enjoin.7"
Altai argued that Altai II barred CA from continuing the French
action" under the doctrine of res judicata7 or, alternatively, collateral
6

See Mota, supra note 37, at n.54 (describing CA Paris as an intermediate appellate court that

has jurisdiction to hear all
appeals from any court within its geographic territory).
69
See Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 368.
70
See CA Paris,95/14189 at 2; Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 368.
71
See CA Paris, 95/14189 at 2 (stating that Altai failed to establish the three-fold res judicata
requirements of identical parties, objects, and issues).
'n
See id. at 9 (noting that CA. who "had the technical means to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the
Commercial Court's assessment," did not even attempt to show that functional imperatives did not dictate
the structure of ADAPTER). Presumably, had CA showed the existence of comparable, alternative means
that Altai could have adopted instead of merely changing parts of OSCAR 3.4, the Paris Court of Appeals
would have remanded. See id. (rejecting the Commercial Court's finding that copyright protection does
not extend to interfaces).
73
See id. The Paris Court of Appeals did reverse, however, the Commercial Court's award of
100,000 francs to Altai for business losses. See id. at 9-10 (stating that due to Altai's criticizable conduct
in refusing to provide the source codes to the Commercial Court-appointed expert witness in discovery,
fairness does not justify that the Paris Court of Appeals uphold the indemnity granted to Altai for its
unrecoverable expenses).
74
See Altai V1I, 126 F.3d at 368.
75
See id.
76
See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. 43, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
n
See supra note 31; see also Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d. Cir. 1994) (stating that
res judicata provides preclusion from relitigation of claims that could have been raised in the action already
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estoppel.7 In Altai VI, the district court rejected Altai's resjudicata argument
for want of subject matter jurisdiction,7 9 finding that it had jurisdiction solely
over the United States copyright infringement claim.80 The Altai Vlcourt also
held that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over FASTER, which was
necessary to make the United States decision dispositive over the French
claim, despite evidence that FASTER previously had submitted voluntarily
to the jurisdiction of United States courts."s Finally, the court rejected res
judicata and collateral estoppel on grounds that the absence of FASTER to the
United States action, and the difference between issues and law, prevented
Altai II from being dispositive to the French action. 2
Addressing the request for an antisuit injunction specifically, the court
denied it on the same grounds used to deny res judicata and collateral
estoppel: lack of similarity of parties and issues. 3 Although the court
recognized its equitable power to enjoin foreign suits by persons subject to its
jurisdiction, it declared that international comity demands that a court issue
an injunction only after it has explored all other remedies."
The court denied the antisuit injunction following application of the
Second Circuit's two-prong threshold test, as delineated in China Trade and
Development Corp. v. M. V. Choong Yong ("China Trade"). 5 The parties of

brought to final judgment). The Altai V/ court relied upon Burgos in order to preclude the use of res
judicata when "the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the
later litigation." See Altai VI. 950 F. Supp. at 51 (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1994)). The Altai VI court agreed with CA that the plaintiff could not have added its French claims to the
United States complaint because they arose afterward and the United States court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. See id.
78
See Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 365 (2d Cir. 1992) (defining collateral estoppel
as "bariring] a party from relitigating in a second proceeding an issue of fact or law that was litigated and
actually decided in a prior proceeding, if that party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue...
and the decision of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits").
See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. at 51.
'
See id. The decision followed precedent set in GB Mktg. USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen,
782 F. Supp. 763, 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), which held that copyright infringement occurring inside and
outside the United States grants the district court jurisdiction only over the United States infringement.
$I
See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. at 52.
82
See id. at 53. The court rejected without explanation Altai's argument that, despite FASTER's
absence from the United States action, the issues and standards governing their adjudication in France and
the United States were identical, thereby warranting collateral estoppel. See id. Although the court
previously referenced the Berne Convention and the Uniform Copyright Convention as the source for CA's
right to seek remedy for infringement in France, no discussion followed on how these same conventions
might show some level of uniformity in the issues and legal standards employed in France and the United
States. See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. at 53.
3
See id. at 53-54.
u
See id. at 53 (citing language from United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985)).
s
China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987) ("ChinaTrade").
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both suits must be the same, and the issues in both suits must be the same so
that their adjudication before the enjoining court is dispositive of the action
to be enjoined. 6 The court found that Altai met neither of these two
requirements and denied the injunction. The China Trade test requires the
consideration of five additional factors8 upon fulfillment of the two-prong
threshold test.8 9 Since the court found the threshold test unfilled, the court
refused to address these factors in Altai VI.
Altai appealed to the Second Circuit in Altai VII, arguing that the China
Trade factors were inapplicable where a United States forum has reached a
final judgment.9 The court declined to address this issue because, through
application of another China Trade test, Altai's case failed to show that an
injunction was necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the court or the
integrity of the court's judgment. 2
In China Trade'sdissent, Senior Circuit Judge Bright emphasized that a
second action brought abroad would be vexatious to the parties and would
potentially frustrate the proceedings of the United States court.93 Judge Bright
acknowledged that comity demands that United States courts must ordinarily
respect the concurrent jurisdiction of sovereign courts.9 4 Judge Bright also
stated, however, that Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines
("Laker Airways") "emphasizes that if a substantial amount of time has

86

See Altai VI,950 F.Supp. at 54 (applying two-prong threshold test as articulated in China Trade

& Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1987)).
87
See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. at 54.
B
See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35-36 (stating the five factors to consider as: 1)frustration of
forum's policy; 2) vexation created by foreign action; 3) threat to issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction; 4) prejudice or inequity in foreign proceeding; or 5) adjudication of same issues in separate
actions would result in delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment).
The ChinaTrade court reversed an antisuit injunction granted via application of the two-prong
threshold test and consideration of the additional five factors, stressing that the "equitable factors relied
upon by the district court ... are not sufficient to overcome the restraint and caution required by
international comity." Id. at 36.
9
See Altai VI, 950 F. Supp. at 54.
90
See id.
91
See Altai Vll, 126 F.3d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
9
See id (applying two-prong test as articulated in China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36-37).
93
See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 38 (Bright J., dissenting) (quoting China Trade and Dev. Corp.
v. M.V. Chong Yong, No. 85-8794, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1987). Judge Bright commented that,
due to the high cost of litigation today, the court has an affirmative duty to prevent a litigant from entering
a forum court in order to confuse, obfuscate, or complicate litigation in this country. See id. at 40.
%
See id. at 38 (commenting on effect of decision in Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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elapsed between the commencement of the two actions, equitable principles
make it more appropriate to enjoin the second action.""5
Applying this reasoning to Altai' s appeal in Altai VII, it appears that some
discussion over the timing of CA's appeal of the French decision was proper.
Judge Bright stated that even under Laker Airways's strict standard, an
injunction is proper when a party files a foreign action almost two and onehalf years after the United States action." At the time of the ruling in Altai
VII, CA had appealed the French decision over three years after Altai 11 ruled
that OSCAR 3.5 did not infringe CA's copyright to ADAPTER.97
Despite the length of time between the French appeal and Altai 11, the
Altai VII court emphatically denied the injunction because, even if all the
equitable factors were present, the facts of the case still did not warrant an
injunction.9" The Altai VII court conceded that the French proceeding was
vexatious, but found that res judicata and collateral estoppel were impossible
because the parties and issues were not the same. 99 Essentially, the Altai VII
court ruled that international comity barred an antisuit injunction in the
absence of an established need to protect the court's jurisdiction or
judgment.1 °o

Id.at 38-39 (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,929
n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
See id. at 39.
%
97
See Altai VII, 126 F.3d at 367-68.
See id at 372.
9
See id. CA initiated the United States litigation on the eve of Altai's planned merger with a
competitor of CA. Due to the costs and publicity of the copyright infringement lawsuit, the competitor
canceled the merger. See Mota, supra note 37, para. 29. That competitor likely was Goal Systems
International, Inc. ("Goal Systems"). Compare Altai, Goal Systems Sign Letter of Intent for Merger, PR
NEWSWiRE, July 25,1988 (stating that Goal Systems is a privately-held corporation that "designs, develops,
markets, and supports software products for the major IBM mainframe operating systems"), with Computer
Associates: About CA, (visited Sept. 29, 1998) <http://www.cai.com/about.htm> (stating that CA is a world
leader in mission-critical business software which develops, licenses, and supports over 500 products).
While CA may have struck a blow to its competition and obtained a $344,000 relief in Altai 1, the costs of
litigation negated both gains considerably. See Mota, supra note 37, para. 30. The French litigation
destroyed forty-seven percent of Altai's foreign revenue, forcing FASTER to liquidate its assets while owing
Altai $258,000. See id., para. 29. Due in part to Altai's business losses and litigation expenses, Platinum
Technology, Inc. ("Platinum") easily purchased Altai on August 23, 1995. See PlatinumTechnology and
Altai FinalizeAcquisition;Altai Becomes a Platinum Technology Subsidiary,BUS. WIRE, Aug. 23, 1995
(reporting that Platinum exchanged 1,100,000 shares of Platinum common stock for all of the outstanding
Altai shares); see also Platinum's Corporate Background: About Platinum, (visited Nov. 15, 1998)
<http./www.platinum.com/corp/corphist.htm> (stating that Platinum is the world's seventh largest
independent software vendor with 1997 revenues of $739 million).
1o
See Altai VII, 126 F.3d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
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D. Altai's Petitionfor Certiorari
1.

ALTAI'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF GRANT OF CERTIORARI

Altai filed a petition for certiorari on February 27, 1998,'10 arguing that
Altai VII highlights the tension between the principles of international comity
and the duty of United States courts to enforce principles of finality and
repose"° that are bedrocks of American law. 3 Altai asserted that with the
advent of the Internet, similar international commerce cases with similar
international law issues would soon inundate United States courts." Altai
urged the Court to hear the case because the distribution of copyright
infringing works over the Internet will soon lead to simultaneous causes of
action in numerous Member States of the Berne Convention.'0 3
. Altai emphasized that the global economy necessitates
the issuance of
foreign antisuit injunctions requested by United States parties in order to
0 6
ensure that final United States judgments avoid collateral attack in seriatim"
7
litigation around the world." Moreover, when a United States party requests
a foreign antisuit injunction, "there should be no lack of uniformity or
ambiguity among the lower courts about the standard for granting it."'0 °
Next, Altai illustrated the division in the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals regarding the standards used to issue a foreign antisuit injunction."
Altai noted that in the circuits employing the conservative or "strict" standard,
no court has issued a foreign antisuit injunction." 0 Meanwhile, in the circuits
following the liberal, or "lax" standard, a party could obtain a foreign antisuit
injunction merely upon showing "that the parallel proceeding imposes an
unreasonable burden on the defendant.""' Altai asserted that its case
demonstrates how the division in the circuits can deliver grave injustice upon

101

SeeAltai V1I, 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997),petitionforcert.filed, 66 U.S.LW. 1197 (U.S. Feb.

27, 1998) (No. 97-1417).
102

See WEBSTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1926 (3d ed. 1961) (defining "repose" as

a "cessation or absence of activity, movement, or animation").
,1W
1o

l05

See
See
See
See

Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 15.
id. at 15-16.
id. at 16.
WEBSTER's NEw INTERNATIONALDIcrONARY 2073 (3d ed. 1961) (defining "seriatim" as

106
describing the action of setting forth things or statements "in a series").
107
Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 16.
109
1o

""0

III

Id.
See id. at 16-19; see also discussion infra Part IlL
Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 20.
Id.
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parties that deserve a foreign antisuit injunction but fall into a lessaccommodating circuit."1 2
Altai also attempted to show the Court that, while the doctrine of
international comity is ephemeral in nature, "3 the preclusion of claims and the
principles of finality and repose' 14 are well established in American
jurisprudence."' Altai attempted to show the Court how international comity
and claim preclusion may find reconciliation by illustrating Judge Posner's
decision in Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc. ("Allendale")." 6
Finally, Altai argued that irrespective of whether the appropriate standard
for issuing an antisuit injunction should be the conservative"' or liberal" s
9 or
standard, either of Judge Posner's proposed rules of reconciliation,"
2
'
decide.'
to
Court
the
for
another rule,' the matter was ripe

112

Id. (claiming that had Altai been able to request the foreign antisuit injunction in the Fifth

Circuit, where it is incorporated, or in the Seventh Circuit, where its parent company is located, it would
have obtained the injunction).
113
See id. at 21 (noting confusion in courts in the use and understanding of "comity" and
"international comity"). In support, Altai cites Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting), where Justice Scalia explained that when the lower courts use the terms they
do not refer to "the comity of courts, whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more
appropriately adjudged elsewhere," but rather to the respect sovereign nations grant each other by limiting
the extraterritorial reach of their laws.
114
See Altai Petition for Certiorari, supranote 48, at 22 (citing support that claim preclusion and
principles of finality and repose are more established than international comity). Altai cited Federated
Dep't Stores,Inc. v. Moitie, where then Justice Rehnquist stated that public policy dictates that "those who
have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest and that matters once tried shall be
considered forever settled as between the parties .. ." Id. (quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 401 (1979) (elaborating that res judicata is not a procedural norm, but rather a rule of
fundamental and substantial justice)).
[is
See AItai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 22.
116
See id. at 23-24 (citing Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc.. 10 F.3d 425,431-33(7th
Cir. 1993)). In Allendale, Judge Posner suggested two ways in which lower courts could determine the
propensity of a request for an antisuit injunction. First, the opponent to the antisuit injunction should
demonstrate that the injunction would in fact disturb the foreign relations of the United States. See
Allendale, 10 F.3d at 433. This evidentiary proffer would allow the lower courts to ignore international
comity objections of the "purely theoretical" nature so that they may not "trump a concrete and persuasive
demonstration of harm to the applicant for the injunction.. ." Md. Second, when a United States party is
unable to plead res judicata to a foreign court, which would deprive that party of the benefit of the United
States judgment, considerations of comity should not prevent a federal court, even under the strict or
conservative standard, from enjoining a foreign defendant or a United States party from proceeding, in
defiance of the judgment, in a foreign court. See id.
117
See discussion infra Part ILA.
Il
See discussion infra Part I.B.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATtONSLAW§ 421(l) (1987) (grantingUnited
120
States jurisdiction over the person or thing when the relationship of the state to the person or thing is such
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2. CA's BRIEF INOPPOSITION TO GRANT OF CERTIORARI
CA argued that the potential conflict between the domestic and foreign
judgments that Altai discussed does not exist.12 2 Assuming that such conflict
did exist, CA argued that Altai's failure to satisfy the two-prong threshold
test, as applied in all circuits, precludes its request for an antisuit
injunction. 124 The first prong, similarity of parties, fails because of the
addition of FASTER and L'Agence to the French action. 125 As for the second
prong, similarity of issues, the difference between CA's copyright in France
and the United States, prevents the United States judgment from disposing of
26
the French action. 1
CA next attacked Altai's attempt to materialize ajusticiable controversy
out of dicta from the opinion in Altai VII.' 7 CA implicitly argued that even
if Altai had met the threshold test of similarity of parties and issues, under

as to make the exercise ofjurisdiction reasonable under its inclusive fist); Laura M. Salava, Balancing
Comity With Antisuit Injunctions: ConsiderationsBeyond Jurisdiction,20 J. LEGIS. 267, 270 (1994)
(advocating that the Advisory Committee amend Rule 65 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include
Subsection F that adopts the conservative standard). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
121
See Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 24; see also Swanson, supra note 6, at 37
(concluding that the issue of what standards are appropriate for the issuance of foreign antisuit injunctions
is "ripe for resolution by the Supreme Court"); Arif S. Haq, Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp.: Comity in
InternationalJudicialRelations,22 N.C. J. INT'LL &CoM. REG. 365,388 (1996) (stating the need for the
Court to resolve the division in the circuits in order to make consistent judgments).
12
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998) (denying cert.) [hereinafter CA Opposition to Certiorari] (articulating
inadequacies of Altai's arguments).
123
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
124
See CA Opposition to Certiorari, supra note 122, at 5.
325
See id. at 7. What might have been lost by the courts in Altai V1 and V1l, is that the two French
parties that had disrupted Altai's claim ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel, L'Agence and FASTER, were
not parties to CA's appeal of the Commercial Court's decision in 1998. See CA Paris,95/14189 at 2
(stating that L'Agence is no longer a party to the appeal and that creditors had liquidated FASTER). Altai
alerted the Court in its petition of this occurrence, attempting to show the vexatious and awkward character
of an appeal that ultimately consisted of two United States parties litigating in France. See Altai Petition
for Certiorari, supra note 48, at n. 11 (stating that L'Agence is no longer part of litigation and that FASTER
went out of business on September 25, 1990).
12
See id.
327
See id. at 8 (stating that Altai has no basis to assert a "circuit split" regarding the appropriate
adherence to international comity because that issue was never raised in the case). Altai began its analysis
of the division in the circuits regarding the standards federal courts use to issue foreign antisuit injunctions
by citing Altai VII's denial of the injunction. See Altai Petition for Certiorari, supranote 57, at 13 (quoting
Altai Vii, 126 F.3d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1997) ("We can discern no basis for enjoining [CA] from pursuing
its French action; moreover[,] the interests of comity caution against such an injunction.")).
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either the liberal or the conservative standard, no federal court would have
issued the foreign antisuit injunction."'
In closing, CA stated that public policy considerations support the Second
Circuit's denial of the antisuit injunction. 9 CA cautioned that Altai's
position-that the United States should decide all copyright claims worldwide
-would lead to a hyper-clogging of the federal court dockets and force the
courts to deal "with legal experts on foreign law, problems of discovery in
foreign countries, translations of foreign-language documents, and many other
issues now left for the courts of those countries."'' 3
Despite Altai's arguments and the pleas of many legal scholars, 3 ' the
Court chose not to address the division in the circuits. 32 The press generally
neglected to cover Altai's petition for certiorari. 3 3 Thus, without much
fanfare, the Court denied Altai's petition for certiorari on May 4, 1998."3
HI. THE DIVISION INTHE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS OF
APPEALS

A. The ConservativeStandard
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Sixth,
and District of Columbia Circuits, restrain their equitable power to issue
antisuit injunctions by requiring the proponent to demonstrate that an
injunction is necessary to protect the forum's jurisdiction, or to prevent
evasion of the forum's important public policies. 3 Although these circuits
In See CA Opposition to Certiorari. supra note 122, at 9 (criticizing Altai's use of contract cases
such as Alendale and Kaepa, Inc.). CA argued that these two cases were irrelevant to CA's copyright
infringement action, which involved two independent intellectual property rights granted under the laws
of the respective fora. See id.Allendale and Kaepa, Inc. are "inapposite because once a final judgment
is reached in a contract case, the prevailing party has the ability to apply res judicata, collateral estoppel,
or both in concurrent litigation regarding the same contract." Id4
129
See id. at 11-12 (criticizing Altai's position that the United States could and should decide all
copyright claims worldwide).
'13
See id. at ll.
13
See cited articles supranote 121.
132
See Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 1106 (1998).
'33

See generally, High Court Won't Review Denial Of Injunction Against French Copyright

Action, 6 MEALEY'S LriG. REP.: INTEuL PROP. 7 (reporting on Altai's failed petition for certiorari); Sup.
Ct. Turns Down Cert. Petitions On Jurisdiction,Antitrust, 15 ANDREWS COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS.

Lr1G. REP. 12 (May 19, 1998) (reporting Altai's failed petition for certiorari).
134
See Altai, Inc., 523 U.S. at 1106.
'35
See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987);
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981); Gau
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state adherence to the two-prong threshold" 6 and five-factor test 137 as
articulated in China Trade, their reverence of international comity precludes
issuance3 of an antisuit injunction absent a threat to their jurisdiction or
1
policy.
The District of Columbia Circuit fully articulated the conservative
standard in LakerAirways, issuing the decree that "duplication of parties and
issues alone is not sufficient to justify the issuance of an antisuit
injunction."'' 39 The Laker Airways court added that the liberal circuits'
policies of "avoiding hardship to parties and promoting the economies of

consolidated litigation" are not the basis for antisuit injunction but more
properly considered in a motion for dismissal underforumnon conveniens 4
This analysis survives upon the premise that, in all situations where a party
requests an antisuit injunction, the court has the luxury of also weighing the
elements of a forum non conveniens motion. 4 '
In the case of Altai, when the foreign action is the second proceeding, a
forum non conveniens motion would fail its primary goal of allowing the
parties to adjudicate their dispute in the most convenient forum. 4 2 Where the

Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349,1358 (6th Cir. 1992); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,927 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
IM
See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 39 (requiring the similarity of parties and issues before
determining the propriety of issuing a foreign antisuit injunction).
137
See id.at 35-36 (stating five factors to consider as 1) frustration of forum's policy; 2) vexation
created by foreign action; 3) threat to issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; 4) prejudice or
inequity in foreign proceeding; or 5) adjudication of same issues in separate actions would result in delay,
inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment).
13
See Raushenbush, supra note 7, at 1051 (explaining that the "conservative'approach to antisuit
injunctions prohibits their issue without a showing of threat to jurisdiction or evasion of the public policies
of the forum).
139
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 928.
140

d.

See Furuta,supra note 7, at 9 (stating elements offorum non conveniens as when the United
States court deems itself a seriously inconvenient forum and an alternative forum exists). One scholar
proposes that the courts may avoid the potential damage to international comity presented by foreign
antisuit injunctions by more extensively employing aforum non conveniens determination first. See Baer,
supra note 7,at 175 (arguing that, after a United States federal court finds that the parties and issues are
similar in both the domestic and foreign action, it should make aforum non conveniens determination, sua
sponte if necessary). If the United States federal court decides that it is the most appropriate forum to
adjudicate the dispute, it should order the party requesting the antisuit injunction to ask the foreign court
to dismiss or stay its proceeding under the doctrine offorum non conveniens. See id.If the foreign court
refuses to relinquish its jurisdiction over the parties, the United States federal court then may decide
whether to issue the antisuit injunction. See id.
142
See id.; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) ("[Wlhere the
remedy offered by the [foreign] forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the [foreign] forum may not be an adequate
alternative.").
141
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parties are international businesses based in the United States, it seems logical
that the most convenient forum, considering the applicable law and the
interests of the parties, would reside in the United States. 43 That the party
would request an antisuit injunction suggests that the foreign forum is either
inconvenient or inappropriate. Altai argued both points unsuccessfully in
Altai VI and VII.
Scholars laud the conservative standard because it adequately reflects the
goals of international comity: global cooperation and respect for sovereign
judicial systems.'" These goals, however, are as ephemeral and vague as the
comity doctrine. Nevertheless, one supporter believes the conservative
standard reflects the "consideration of the practical needs of the forum state
and the international system," which in turn allows for the creation of a
smoothly functioning mechanism for dispute resolution. 4
Under the conservative standard, however, the smooth functioning of the
global legal system entails the allowance of duplicative litigation to the vexation of both the foreign legal system and the parties involved.'" While the
amount of jurisprudence is small, Laker Airways 4 7 represents the only instance in which a circuit under the conservative standard issued a foreign anti149
suit injunction. 4 The results of this reticence are massive litigation costs,

14
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,508-509 (1947) (stating that the court must consider
"the appropriateness of having the trial of a diversity case in the forum that is at home with the state law
that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle the problems in conflict
of law, and in foreign law itself").
IU
See Swanson, supra note 6, at 36 (stating that, while the conservative standard does not provide
"the perfect solution in every case," it does create opportunity for global cooperation); see also Lenenbach,
supra note 65, at 265 (supporting the stricter approach to antisuit injunctions that recognizes complexity
of world economy and "that the United States cannot expect to impose its point of view on the rest of the
world"); Haig Najaran, Granting Comity Its Due: A Proposal to Revive the Comity-based Approach to
Transnational Antisuit Injunctions, 68 ST. JoHN'S L REv. 961,983 (1994) (litigation is public in nature
and, as an exercise of sovereignty, should use comity).
145
See Swanson, supra note 6, at 36 (arguing that the liberal standard encourages judicial conflict,
hinders dispute resolution, and ignores the interest in developing an international system).
146
See Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 19-20 (stating that in the conservative circuits
one must assume "the significant financial burden and commercial uncertainty of litigating a parallel
foreign proceeding").
147
See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (issuing foreign antisuit injunction in
order to protect its jurisdiction).
14
Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 20 (stating that no circuit under the conservative
standard has issued a foreign antisuit injunction when the issue is parallel litigation). The LakerAirways
court issued an antisuit injunction not because the parallel litigation was vexatious, but rather because the
English court attempted to obtain exclusive jurisdiction. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 930.
149
See, e.g., Dowler, supra note 27, at 363-64 (noting that duplicative foreign litigation may
eliminate plaintiff's United States relief, breach comity, unduly burden litigants, and threaten the public
policies of the United States forum); Nancy Nelson, Forum Non Conveniens, Comity, Antisuit Injunctions,
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waste of judicial resources, 5 0 and a near complete failure of the doctrine of
res judicata.111
B. The Liberal Standard
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, exercise their equitable power to issue antisuit injunctions
where there is a duplication of parties, issues, and where the foreign action
would be 1) against public policy of the forum issuing the injunction; 2)
vexatious or oppressive; 3) threatening to the issuing court's in rem or quasi
in rem jurisdiction; or 4) prejudicial to other equitable considerations. 2
InAllendale, the Seventh Circuit articulated the liberal standard's extreme
view that international comity is purely a theoretical doctrine. 3 Where the
opponent can show that the antisuit injunction will in fact damage the foreign
relations of the United States, the court must weigh that damage against the
proponent's equitable considerations." The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
where a foreign court showed concern over the antisuit injunction, it would
inform the United States court through the55United States State Department or
foreign offices of the concerned country.
Altai attempted to convince the Supreme Court that the analysis of
Allendale provides a practical adherence to international comity while still
allowing the opportunity for the court to weigh the equitable concerns of

and Parallel Proceedings, 90 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L PRoc. 62, 66 (1996) (describing Citibank Corp.'s
involvement in expensive litigation in Australia).
150
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37
VA. J. INT'LL 587,602 (1997) (arguing that judicial economy favors retaining the action with the United
States court that has already gained some acquaintance to the facts and that offers a forum to ascertain
many of the same facts that would be adduced abroad).
1SI
See. e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 58, at 307 (analyzing the difficulty of obtaining resjudicata
for United States final judgments in French courts); Weintraub, supra note 58, at 167, n.101 (elaborating
that the exequatur process "differ[s] from country to country and can be onerous"); Vargas, supra note 58,
at 147 (stating that even when a proponent complies with all conditions for issuance of an exequatur, there
is no guarantee that the foreign judgment will be enforced).
,52
See Canadian Filters, Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578-79 (1st Cir. 1969); Kaepa,
Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10
F.3d 425,431 (7th Cir. 1993); Seattle Totems Hockey Club. Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852,
856 (9th Cir. 1981).
"5
See Allendale, 10 F.3d at 432-33; see also Kaepa,Inc., 76 F.3d at 627 (declining to force court
to "genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity").
,54
See Allendale, 10 F.3d at 432-33.
155
See Philips Med. Sys. Int'l v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
injunctions are necessary to protect party from multiplicity of suits for purpose of harassment).
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United States parties. t56 It is impossible to ascertain whether the Court
seriously considered Altai's argument.
The main criticism against the liberal standard is that it completely
ignores comity."5 ' Through the liberal issuance of antisuit injunctions,
judicial resources may be saved in the short-term, but ultimately the savings
could be off-set by difficulties and costs incurred while enforcing the
injunction against the foreign court or fighting the foreign court's issuance of
a counter-injunction or anti-antisuit injunction. 5 '
Scholars regard the decisions in Allendale'5 9 and Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles
Corp.,1 6 as demonstrative of those circuits' "flawed understanding of
comity.' ' t6t One critic stated that the Allendale decision shows a
"misunderstanding of the doctrine" of international comity because it creates
an analysis that "turns on political questions presented by the case rather than
legal questions that should be addressed by the court."' 62
C. Effect on InternationalBusiness

1. REPERCUSSIONS OF AN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION
When a federal court denies a request for a foreign antisuit injunction, it
forces the litigants to use more than one stone to kill one bird by splitting their

See Altai Petition for Certiorari, supra note 48, at 24.
157
See Swanson, supra note 6, at 33 (arguing that liberal circuits' emphasis on vexatious or
oppressive nature of the duplicative litigation disregards its international context).
158
See id. (stating that there is ultimately no way for the United States court to compel a foreign
court to not exercise its jurisdiction). In Laker Airways, the court affirmed the lower court's issuance of
the antisuit injunction because an English court had threatened the United States jurisdiction by asserting
its exclusive jurisdiction. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
159
See supra text accompanying note 116 (discussing decision in Alendale).
160
See supra text accompanying note 17 (discussing rationale behind decision in Kaepa, Inc.). In
Kaepa, Inc., the court upheld the federal district court decision to enjoin aparty from asserting a duplicative
claim in foreign court where such litigation would cause "inequitable hardship" and "tend to frustrate and
delay the speedy and efficient determination of the cause." Kaepa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 627 (quoting In re
Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1970)). The Kaepa, Inc. court was the first to articulate
the "actual threat standard," whereby the opponent must show that issuance ofthe antisuit injunction would
somehow damage the foreign relations of the United States. See Kaepa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 627.
161
Swanson, supra note 6,at 35 (arguing that the Seventh and Fifth Circuits misapplied doctrine
of international comity); see also Haq, supra note 121, at 386-88 (stating that courts should adjudicate
disputes without considering political judgments regarding the effects of their actions); Najaran, supranote
144, at 984 (arguing that the court in Allendale failed to assess comity within its proper context by holding
that the opponent must offer evidence of damage to United States foreign relations to stop the issuance of
an antisuit injunction).
162
Swanson, supra note 6, at 36-37.
156
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financial resources to adjudicate their dispute in two or more jurisdictions.'
Opponents of the conservative standard fear that, in an era of high litigation
costs at the domestic level, allowing additional litigation abroad would significantly exacerbate the problem.' If the Court allows multiple, duplicative
litigation to continue unabated, these litigation costs will likely force fledgling
companies out of international markets. 6 ' The result of the conservative
market
circuits' reverence of international comity could be an international
t66
dominated exclusively by gigantic transnational companies
In the alternative, when a federal court issues a foreign antisuit injunction,
it allows the litigants to "kill one bird with one stone" by conserving
resources and concentrating on one forum to resolve the dispute. 67 While the

issuance of an antisuit injunction conserves global judicial resources, it also
prevents the foreign jurisdiction from developing its jurisprudence in that
particular area of law.'6s Critics summarily declare that the issuance of an
antisuit injunction conveys the message to the foreign court that the United
States disrespects its ability to handle the dispute. 69 In Kaepa, Inc., the court
See Baer, supra note 7, at 155-56 (discussing the circumstances surrounding a request for an
antisuit injunction).
16
See Dowler, supra note 27, at 369 (finding that the United States courts' reverence of comity
and refusal to issue antisuit injunctions ironically allows the foreign court to breach comity at the expense
of the United States litigants); Mota, supra note 37, paras. 29-30 (indicating that Altai and CA incurred
immense litigation and business costs from nearly a decade of copyright and antisuit litigation).
165
See supratext accompanying note 99 (discussing financial and business impact upon Altai from
copyright and antisuit injunction litigation). while big businesses such as CA have realized the power of
forcing expensive multiple-fora litigation upon its up-start competitors, they have also recognized the need
for an international framework to govern multiple claims against them. See GlobalBusiness Dialogueon
ElectronicCommerce: Introduction,("GBDe") (visited Sept. 11, 1999) <http'/www.gbde.orgintro.htm>
(outlining purposes of organization); see also GBDe Business Steering Committee, (visited Sept. 11, 1999)
<httpJ/www.gbde.org/conference/participants-e.html> (providing list of corporate participants in global
conference of September 13, 1999, and founding members of organization). The GBDe seeks to facilitate
the formation of jurisdictional reforms regarding intellectual property litigation, in particular, stronger
enforcement and international harmonization of intellectual property protections. See GBDe: Issue Group
Conference Brief,(visited Sept. 11, 1999) <httpJ/www.fujitsu.co.jphypertext/Events/gbde-ipr/>.
166
See Dowler, supra note 27, at 365 (indicating that loss of predictability of foreign jurisdiction
may force some businesses to trade elsewhere due to high risk and cost).
167
See Ginsburg, supranote 150, at 602 (limiting the litigation the United States forum conserves
globaijudicial resources and provides the litigants abetter opportunity to adjudicate their dispute in a forum
already acquainted with the facts).
16
See Salava, supranote 120, at 269 (stating that recognizing comity allows for the development
of a mutually beneficial legal regime in which international commerce can flourish).
16
See Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F. 2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that
antisuit injunctions convey the message, intended or not, that the issuing court has little confidence in the
foreign court's ability to adjudicate the dispute fairly and efficiently). See also Salava, supranote 120, at
269 (concluding that when the United States court issues an antisuit injunction and prevents a party from
appearing before a foreign court that has proper jurisdiction, the United States judiciary conveys the
163
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noted that this simplistic inference becomes less of an egregious international
incident, however, when one considers the antisuit injunction for what it is:
an order by a United States court upon a party over which the court has
personal jurisdiction."°
2. RESPONSE TO INJUNCTION/MULTIPLE LITIGATION DILEMMA
The United States Supreme Court has indicated the rationale that only by
reaching decisions reflecting the needs of the international system can our
courts develop a regime within which United States international business can
compete effectively.'
Despite this decree, critics of the liberal standard
insist that recent cases "show a lack of sensitivity and sophistication relating
to the issues presented by antisuit injunctions and international comity."' 72
Therefore, these scholars reason the Court must demonstrate the concern that
some circuits lack, grant certiorari to the next available case, and establish a
uniform standard. "' If the Court fails to act decisively soon, some critics fear
that United States leadership in the emerging international system will
wane.

174

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution ' 5 does not apply to foreign judgments.7 6 Thus, in

message that it lacks confidence in the foreign court's ability); International Legal Developments in
Review: 1996 Business Transactions and Disputes, 31 INT'L L 317 (1997) (stating that an antisuit
injunction, while technically against the parties, offends the foreign court's jurisdiction and sovereignty).
'70
See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624,626 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that the circuit
courts have established that the federal courts have the power to enjoin persons subject to theirjuisdiction
from litigation abroad). Implicitly, the court argued that to assume that every antisuit injunction
automatically disturbs international comity would "require a district court to genuflect before a vague and
omnipotent notion of comity every time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign action." Id. at 627.
17
See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 (1982) (stating that the doctrine of
comity, jurisprudence, and restatements all fail to allow courts to make decisions that serve not only the
interest of the court's sovereign or the competing court's sovereign, but also the needs of the global

community).
172
Swanson, supra note 6, at 37 (concluding that the issue of what standards are appropriate for
the issuance of foreign antisuit injunctions is "ripe for resolution by the Supreme Court").
1"
See, e.g., id.; Haq, supra note 121, at 388 (stating that the need for a consistent policy toward
antisuit injunctions requires the Court to resolve the division in the circuits).
174
See Swanson, supra note 6, at 37 (concluding that the Court's reticence may affect United States
international leadership).
75
See U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
176
See Aetna life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912) (stating that the Constitution
does not require full faith and credit "to the judgments of foreign states or nations"). While state and
federal courts are not required by the Constitution to recognize foreign judgments, as a general matter the
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response to the growing incidence of multiple, duplicative litigation, scholars
and practitioners have called for the adoption of a global judgments

recognition agreement."

Regional agreements, such as the European

Community's Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters ("EC Convention on Jurisdiction")... and
the Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for
the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments,'7 9 have been successful.'s
The EC encounters parallel litigation frequently and, in order to adequately support its ideal of free circulation of goods and persons, adheres to the
"first-filed rule.'' Where litigants initiate proceedings involving the same
cause of action and parties in multiple courts of different Member States, the
first court to obtain jurisdiction hears the case, and all other courts are bound
courts will enforce a foreign judgment unless the opponent to recognition can establish that the foreign
court violated American standards ofprocedural due process or lacked personaljurisdiction over the parties.
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1895). The party seeking foreign enforcement of a foreign
judgment must demonstrate to the American court that the foreign court exercised jurisdiction over the
parties and conducted a fair trial of the merits. The American court will not recognize the foreign judgment
if it finds that the rationale of the foreign court and/or its decision violates the public policy of the American
forum. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(explaining that the specific reason for refusing to recognize a foreign judgment on public policy grounds
may vary and is highly discretionary, i.e., the foreign law that controlled the judgment may be repugnant
to the American court's conception of decency and justice).
'77
See, e.g., Dowler, supra note 27, at 363 (arguing that a multilateral full-faith and credit
agreement is the only solution that could formalize the notion of comity among nations, assure reciprocity,
consistency, predictability, judicial efficiency, and equity between and among judicial fora); Weintraub,
supra note 58, at 167-68 (discussing benefits of ajudgments-recognition convention); Matthew H. Adler,
If We Build It, Will They Come?-The Need for a MultilateralConvention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79, 80 (1994) (arguing that a
multilateral judgment convention would be beneficial, but would require the United States to concede that
foreign delegations unequivocally will demand that the convention exclude United States judgments
involving treble and punitive damages).
178
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Einforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
art. 28, Sept. 27, 1968, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention) (binding all EC Member
States to recognize the judgments of other Member States even if they have jurisdiction over dispute).
179
Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial
Validity of Foreign Judgments, art.
1,May 24, 1984, O.A.S. TREATY SER. No. A/39 [hereinafter InterAmerican Convention] (providing for the recognition by all Member States of Member State in personam
moneyjudgments and decisions relating to tangible, movable property). The United States has not ratified
the Inter-American Convention. See Weintraub, supranote 58, at n.10.
"o
See Dowler, supra note 27, at 398 (indicating that the Brussels Convention and the InterAmerican Convention are successful because they control closely-linked economic, geographic, and
political areas). The Hague Conference on Private International Law ("Hague Conference"), established
in 1893, has met and attempted to draft a multilateral judgments recognition convention. See Weintraub,
supra note 58, at n.1 (defining the Hague Conference as an organization that focuses on the drafting of
multilateral conventions covering choice of law and procedural problems of international litigation).
1s1 See EC Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 65, arts. 21-23.
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to decline jurisdiction. 2 If the proceedings are "related [and] are so closely
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the
risk of irreconcilable judgments from separate proceedings," all courts8 after
3
the first-filed court may stay their proceedings or decline jurisdiction.
Despite the obvious benefit of a multilateral agreement such as the EC
Convention on Jurisdiction -judicial systems of all Member States would
grant the judgments of other Member State courts full faith and credit" 4 its adoption in the near future is unlikely.' Therefore, until foreign courts
provide United States litigants with reasonably predictable exequatur and res
judicata procedures, 6 the antisuit injunction must remain a viable judicial
United States judgment and the
convention to ensure the integrity of 8the
7
interests of the United States litigants.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Attitude Toward Multiple Litigation Must Change
The common law Parallel Proceeding Rule.88 generally allows multiple192
18
184

See id., art 21.
Id., art. 22.
See Dowler, supra note 27, at 399 (elaborating that a multilateral judgment recognition

agreement should require that all signatories "abandon the discretionary, ad hoc approach currently
employed to dispose of international cases" of multiple, duplicative litigation).
185
See, e.g., id. at 395 (stating that concluding an international convention on recognition and
enforcement that will address multiple, duplicative litigation and provide for aggressive judicial action will
be a difficult task due to reoccurring themes in the United States of unilateralism, preference for national
over international uniformity, impatience, and penuriousness); Adler, supra note 177, at 80 (stating that
the completion of a multilateral judgment convention would be difficult due to the likely demand by foreign
delegations that the convention exclude United States judgments of treble and punitive damages);
Weintraub, supra note 58, at 220 (concluding that, based on the failure of previous attempts, drafting of
any multilateral convention will reach an impasse or that few countries will ratify any document that
emerges). Recently in 1992, an attempt by the Hague Conference to draft a convention ended in failure
because foreign industry feared United Statesjury awards. See id. at 169 (elaborating thata previous Hague
Conference produced a convention, but only three countries ratified it).
in
See supra note 58 (discussing difficult and unpredictable procedure of obtaining an exequatur
and arguing rs judicata).
19
See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys, Inc., 10 F.3d 425,433 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that
when a United States party is unable to plead res judicata to a foreign court, which would deprive that party
of the benefit of the United States judgment, considerations of comity should not prevent a federal court,
even under the conservative standard, from enjoining a foreign defendant or a United States party from
proceeding, in defiance of the judgment, in a foreign court).
I
See Dowler, supra note 27, at 368 (defining the Parallel Proceeding Rule as a common law
doctrine related to comity in that it provides "guidance where jurisdictional overlaps occur with foreign
courts"). The Parallel Proceeding Rule allows two courts of concurrent in personamjurisdiction over the
parties to proceed with litigation until one court reaches judgment, which the second court may consider
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fora litigation to continue simultaneously until one forum reaches ajudgment
that the parties then may plead as res judicata in the other fora." 9 After the
first forum reaches judgment, however, the Altai cases illustrate that there is
no guarantee available to the victorious party that the foreign fora will give
the United States judgment recognition,'" even to a prima facie degree.'
Therefore, before the United States Supreme Court attempts to define a
uniform standard for the issuance of foreign antisuit injunctions, it needs to
redefine how the United States judiciary views multiple-fora litigation
henceforth."
The common law adopted the Parallel Proceeding Rule over a span of
decades when there was little concern of judicial waste." If the parties could
afford to litigate the same dispute in multiple fora, a court had little incentive
to threaten comity by declaring exclusive jurisdiction.' 4 Today, the reverse
may be true in that the principle concern of the parties and the courts is
judicial efficacy.' 95 The Parallel Proceeding Rule'9 6 and the conservative

as res judicata See id. The Parallel Proceeding Rule, coupled with international comity, significantly
restrains United States courts from preventing multiple, duplicative litigation abroad. See id. By offering
the least resistance to multiple litigation, the Parallel Proceeding Rule appears to offer the greatest safeguard
against collateral litigation relating to which court should adjudicate the dispute. See Louise Ellen Teitz,
Taking Multiple Bites Of The Apple: A Proposal To Resolve Conflicts Of Jurisdiction And Multiple
Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAW. 21, 28 (1992) (elaborating on the use of the Parallel Proceeding Rule and its
effects). The practical result of the Parallel Proceeding Rule, however, is that it merely changes the
litigants' battle from the issue of personal jurisdiction to the determination of the enforcement of the foreign
judgment. See id. at 29 (noting that due to the absence of an international judgment recognition
convention, the focus of any multiple litigation abroad undoubtedly tuns to the enforcement of the first
judgment via res judicata).
in
See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 928 n.53 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (discussing the Parallel Proceeding Rule).
190
See sources cited supra note 58 (elaborating on the difficulty and uncertainty behind exequatur
and res judicata proceedings in foreign courts).
191
See sources cited supra note 5 (elaborating that the doctrine of reciprocity raises the standard
of respect and enforceability of foreign judicial decisions through bilateral agreement from comity, which
is equivalent to a prima facie level of deference, to a level of conclusiveness and res judicata).
192
See Teitz, supra note 188, at 29 (urging the United States to discontinue the legal mentality and
practice of approving the initiation of parallel proceedings in order to lessen the negative "implications of
uninhibited dual litigation").
193
See Pearce,supra note 2, at 526 (tracing comity's origin to the needs of Seventeenth Century
Dutch legal theorists to solve conflict-of-law problems amongst its neighboring countries).
"9
See Teitz, supra note 188, at 24 (noting that as recently as 1990, the United States federal courts
have referred approvingly to the tactic of multiple-fora litigation in different countries as a prudential means
of ensuring enforceability of subsequent judgments); see also Herbstein v. Bruetman, 743 F. Supp. 184,
188 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (characterizing favorably multiple-fora litigation as a means of enforcing subsequent
judgments and not as vexatious duplicative litigation).
I"
See Teitz, supra note 188, at 22 (elaborating that any "run-of-the-mill commercial dispute" may
impose substantial burdens on the litigants and judicial resources to adjudication of not only the dispute,
but also collateral battles over which forum should control the dispute); see also Ginsburg,supra note 150,
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standard's view of international comity t9 disallow judicial efficacy to emerge
as a primary goal.
In order for the United States to remain a leader in the Information Age, 9 8
the United States Supreme Court must redefine the ways that United States
businesses may look to the courts in order to adjudicate their disputes. As
international commerce expands toward a "cybereconomy,", 99 the law must
expand with it in order to adequately protect United States parties. In August
1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") established the
Office of Internet Enforcement.' This new unit of the SEC handles the 120
complaints it receives per day alleging Internet-related securities fraud.2 '
This is an important step in enforcement, but it does not address the problems
of multiple, duplicative litigation.
B. Forum Non Conveniens Fails to Address the Big Picture
Some scholars claim that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
accomplishes the same result as an antisuit injunction without rebuking
international comity. 2' They base this conclusion, however, by arguing form

at 602 (arguing that United States courts should issue an antisuit injunction in order to further the interest
of judicial economy).
19
See Teitz, supra note 188, at 28 (arguing that the Parallel Proceeding Rule spawns an amount

of "hostile injunctive litigation" that will only increase as prescriptivejurisdiction expands with commercial
transactions).
197
See Raushenbush, supranote 7, at 1051 (commenting that the conservative standard elevates
the doctrine of international comity to the virtual exclusion of all other considerations).
I"
See Swanson, supranote 6. at 37 (concluding that the Court's reticence may affect United States

international leadership).
'"
Michael P. Avramovich, The Protection Of InternationalInvestment At The Start Of The
Twenty-first Century: WillAnachronisticNotions f BusinessRender IrrelevantThe OECD'sMultilateral
Agreement On Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALLL REv. 1201,1218-19 (commenting on the possible evolution
of international commerce into a strict "cybereconomy where business transactions exist completely outside
of the jurisdiction of nation-states").
2W
See SEC CreatesOffice of InternetEnforcement to Battle OnlineSecurities Fraud,(visited Nov.
11, 1998) <http./www.sec.gov/news/press98-69.txt>. at paa. 1 (announcing establishment of the Office
of Internet Enforcement).
20
See id., at para. 3. See generally Internet-RelatedLitigation and Administrative Proceedings
Announcements, (visited Sept. 11, 1999) <http'J/www.sec.govlenforce/arintrel.htm> (providing archived
list of SEC intemet-related enforcement actions).
2
See Paul J. Carney, InternationalForum Non Conveniens: "Section 1404.5" - A Proposalin
the Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45 AM. U. L REV. 415, 462-63 (1995)
(proposing a new statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404.5, to reform and clarify the doctrine offorum non conveniens
for use by the United States federal courts). Section 1404.5 would allow United States federal courts to stay
an action so the parties may litigate in a more proper, alternative forum. See id. at 463. As long as a
proper, alternative forum exists for the litigants, the doctrine offorum non conveniens adequately conserves
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over substance, which fails to address what really happens in multiple-fora
litigation. As the Altai cases and others demonstrate, a party may not file an
additional suit abroad until much later in the United States litigation. 2 3 At
that point, the United States court and litigants have already spent a consider2°4
able amount of time and money adjudicating the dispute domestically.
In order for aforum non conveniens ruling to solve the problem of high
litigation costs, vexation, and conflicting judgments, the United States court
must ascertain a proper, alternative forum early in the development of the
United States litigation. When litigation occurs in three or more countries,
however, it is impossible for a United States court to determine whether it is
the "most convenient forum" without hearing some collateral arguments from
the parties,' 5 thereby incurring additional expense for the litigants and the
court.2t 6 If all of the countries involved in the litigation are equally
appropriate fora to adjudicate the dispute, it forces the identification of one
court as controlling and the injunction of the rest to prevent additional
litigation of the dispute until the controlling court completes its proceeding.' °7
Moreover, it is unclear whether United States courts may raise a forum
non conveniens ruling sua sponte.'2 The benefits to international comity are

judicial resources and eliminates multiple-fora litigation for United States multinational corporations. See
id
20
See Altai Vll, 126 F.3d 365,367 (2dCir. 1997) (providing thatCA filed suit in France two years
after commencing litigation in the United States); see also China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong
Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1987) (indicating that the parties commenced the United States litigation
two years before the foreign action); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651
F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1981 (stating that the plaintiff did not file in foreign court until five years after the
United States litigation began); Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (indicating that the
defendant filed suit in foreign court seven months after the United States action commenced); Seattle
Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that the
foreign suit arose twenty-seven months after the United States action).
20
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (determining the appropriate forum
decisively due to the."enormous commitment of judicial time and resources" of litigation).
S
See Carney, supra note 202, at 462 (noting that critics of the doctrine offorum non conveniens
argue the United States courts lack the ability to identify the political and practical inadequacies of foreign
fora).
2
See Baer, supra note 7, at 175 (outlining a four-step process that United States courts should
administer before considering a foreign antisuit injunction). Baer comments that "[i]f the litigation in a
foreign country is truly vexatious or wasteful," the foreign courts may dismiss such proceedings on their
own volition. Id at 179.
W7
See id. (conceding that if the United States court finds that a dismissal under forum non
conveniens is inappropriate, and the foreign fora fail to dismiss their actions, it should then consider a
foreign antisuit injunction).
2
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting simply that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens allows a court to resist imposition upon its jurisdiction of a claim that statute
authorizes it to hear). Overwhelmingly, however, it is the defendant of the action that moves the court to
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obvious in that it removes from the court the burden of ordering a party not
to pursue litigation in a foreign forum that has every right to hear the
However, its application only conserves judicial and litigant
dispute.'
resources when a party pleads forum non conveniens early in the United
States proceeding,2 1 or initiates the action in United States court after a
foreign proceeding."'
C. The Role of Antisuit Injunction in the InformationAge
Until foreign courts provide United States litigants with reasonably
predictable exequatur and res judicata procedures,212 or the United States
ratifies a foreign judgment recognition convention,2" 3 the foreign antisuit
injunction must remain a viable judicial convention to ensure the integrity of
2 4
United States judgments and the interests of the United States litigants. "
Although scholars, practitioners, and institutions have suggested various
manners to address the problem of multiple, duplicative litigation,21 5 many
dismiss under the doctrine. See Baer, supra note 7, at 177 (arguing that a court should be able to raise a
motion to dismiss sua sponte underforum non conveniens).
2W
See Baer, supra note 7, at 172 (commenting that a court's dismissal of an action underforum
non conveniens shows a deference to a foreign court, thereby fostering comity and promoting cooperation
among the judicial systems of the world). Baer argues that both forum non conveniens actions and antisuit
injunctions consolidate the litigation into one forum; the difference is that the former promotes comity,
while the latter hinders it. See id. at 173.
See sources cited supra notes 203-204.
210
211
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S 235, n.22 (1981) (requiring that at the outset of a
forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine that an alternative forum exists). In order to make
a determination that an alternative forum exists, the court must know either which foreign courts have
already exercised jurisdiction over the parties or know enough about the law of possible foreign fora so that
it may determine which courts may exercisejurisdiction in the future. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507
(stating that, although the doctrine offorum non conveniens does not require that a foreign proceeding
already be in progress, it "presupposes at least two for[a] in which the defendant is amenable to process).
212
See sources cited supra note 58 (discussing how to obtain an exequatur and argue res judicata
abroad).
213
See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a multilateral foreign
judgment convention).
214
See AllendaleMut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 433 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that
when a United States party is unable to plead res judicata to a foreign court, which would deprive that party
of the benefit of the United States judgment, considerations of comity should not prevent a federal court,
even under the conservative standard, from enjoining a foreign defendant or an United States party from
proceeding, in defiance of the judgment, in a foreign court).
215
See Salava, supra note 120, at 270 (advocating that the Advisory Committee amend Rule 65 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include Subsection F that adopts the conservative standard); supra
notes 175-180 and accompanying text (arguing that the United States should adopt a multilateral foreign
judgment convention); sources cited supra note 202 (arguing need for the United States to employ the
doctrine offorum non conveniens in order to limit foreign litigation to one forum).
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agree that the most effective response would be that the United States
Supreme Court grant certiorari to the appropriate case and finally define how
United States federal courts should apply the equitable remedy of the foreign
antisuit injunction.2"
This Comment demonstrates that international comity and business
interests cannot receive equal emphasis under either the conservative or the
liberal standard for issuing foreign antisuit injunctions." 7 If the Court adopts
the proper standard and applies it in a practical manner for the Twenty-first
Century, however, the doctrine of international comity can work for
international business.
1. ADOPTION OF THE LIBERAL STANDARD
The United States federal circuits under the conservative standard refuse
to issue an antisuit injunction unless the foreign action threatens their
jurisdiction or policy in the name of international comity.2 ' The caselaw and
this Comment show that only once has a court under the conservative standard
issued a foreign antisuit injunction, 219 indicating that multiple-fora litigation
rarely reaches that level of conflict. Although China Trade provides five
factors for the conservative circuits to consider when determining the
propriety of issuing an injunction, 22° Altai VII illustrates how infrequently the
" '
conservative circuits even consider these factors.22
The liberal standard adequately responds to the reality of multiple,
duplicative litigation,222 by allowing United States courts to exercise their

216

See discussion supra note 121 (discussing need for the United States Supreme Court to resolve

the division in the circuits on the standards used to issue a foreign antisuit injunction).
217
Compare Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the liberal standard fails to provide predictability of judicial system that is crucial to international
commerce), with China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1987) (J.
Bright, dissent) (arguing that when ther is no actual threat to international comity from commercial

litigation, the court has a duty to limit the expense of resources by the court and the litigants by limiting
the dispute to one forum).
See Raushenbush, supra note 7, at 1051 (explaining that the "conservative" approach to antisuit
injunctions prohibits their issue without a showing of threat to jurisdiction or evasion of the public policies
of the forum); see also cited sources supra note 14 (delineating caselaw of conservative standard).
219
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
2M
See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35-36 (citing American Home Assurance Corp. v. Insurance Corp.
of Ireland, Ltd., 603 F. Supp. 636,643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (articulating five factors to consider before issuing
a foreign antisuit injunction)).
221
See Altai VII, 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997)(finding no need to decide whether the China Trade
factors apply).
SSee sources cited supra note 204 (discussing immense cost of multiple-fora litigation).
238
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equitable power to limit the litigation to one forum.223 In Allendale, Judge
Posner reasoned that the practical application of international comity today
requires that the opponent to an antisuit injunction offer some evidence as to
how the injunction would negatively affect the foreign relations of the United
States.224 When the opponent is unable to show a potential detriment to
international comity, the liberal standard allows the court to grant an antisuit
injunction by consistent application of its four-factor test.22
The Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to resolve the
conflict in the circuits, but has denied certiorari in all cases.226 As further
indecision will only exacerbate the problem of multiple, duplicative litigation,
the Court must grant certiorari to the next appropriate case.227 Consistent
application of the liberal standard would allow international businesses to
predict the consequences of their actions in litigation,228 a prerequisite for
international commerce to thrive.229 Moreover, it would eliminate the ability
of larger businesses to extend the duration and expand the fora of litigation
in order to drive a smaller, competitor-litigant into liquidation or allow a
larger company to acquire it. 23° While these benefits are tangible and easily
monitored, the benefits from rigid adherence to international comity are
ephemeral and impossible to quantify. 23' Therefore, in the interests of the
United States businesses and judicial efficacy, the Court should adopt the
liberal standard.
2. ADOPTION OF A "MODERATE" STANDARD

If the United States Supreme Court refuses to adopt the liberal standard,
a compromise between the conservative and liberal standards could also
adequately address the problem of multiple, duplicative litigation. Texas has
attempted to accommodate the concerns of litigants about vexatious litigation
and maintain the doctrine of international comity by simply combining factors

See China Trade, 837 F.3d at 35 (noting that United States federal courts have the equitable
power to enjoin a foreign action by parties subject to their jurisdiction).
M24
See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993).
ns
See supra note 19 and accompanying text (outlining four-prong test of the liberal standard).
226
See cases cited supra note 29.
W
See discussion supra note 121.
2n
See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349,1355 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating value of
predictability in commerce).
2"
See Dowler, supra note 27, at 364-365 (indicating that loss of predictability of foreign
jurisdiction may force some businesses to trade elsewhere due to high risk and cost).
2
See sources cited supra note 99 (discussing financial and business impact of litigation upon
Altai).
231
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
223
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of both the liberal and conservative standards into its test.232 Essentially, the
Texas standard provides the litigants with more reasons to argue for an
antisuit injunction, while allowing a simple showing of vexation to justify its
issuance. 233
A better approach to the moderate standard could operate similar to the
EC Convention on Jurisdiction's first-filed scheme. 2" Where the law
regulating the activity or protecting the right is substantially similar, 235 e.g.,
copyright protection of computer software in the EC and the United States,236
there are negligible concerns of creating an international incident through
disrespect of thejudicial system of another sovereign by limiting the litigation
to the United States forum. 237 Considering that some scholars expect a deluge
of litigation from the hyper-dissemination of goods via the Internet, 238a court

232

See Schimek, supra note 22, at 515-16 (outlining Texas standard for issuing antisuit injunctions

as articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. 1986)). The
Gannon court held that a court may issue an antisuit injunction for one of the following reasons: 1) to
prevent a multiplicity of suits; 2) to protect a party from vexatious litigation; 3) to protect the court's
jurisdiction; or 4) to protect an important public policy of the forum. See Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d
304, 307 (Tex. 1986).
233
See id.
234
See EC Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 65, arts. 21-23 (defining first-filed system to
determine jurisdiction).
2M
Cf. id., art. 22 (providing that if the proceedings are "related [and] are so closely connected that
it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilablejudgments from separate proceedings," all courts after the first-filed court may stay their proceedings or decline jurisdiction).
2M
See Pamela Samuelson, Symposium On U.S.-E.C. Legal Relations: Comparing U.S. and E.C.
CopyrightProtectionfor Computer Programs:Are they More Different than they Seem?, 13 J.L. & COM.
279 (1984) (stating the EC promulgated the Computer Directive in order to harmonize the laws of the
Member States, but also to bring EC law into conformity with United States copyriglt protection of computer programs). Both EC and United States law now view copyright as the appropriate legal protection
of computer programs, considering the programs "literary works." Id. at 280-281. Samuelson discovered
some differences, however, between the Computer Directive and United States copyright law. See id.
Samuelson noted that there remain differences in the following areas: 1) some commercial details, e.g.,
regulation of license contracts; 2) the static nature of the Computer Directive, which requires amendment
for change, whereas United States protection evolves continuously via caselaw; and 3) the absence of
language in the Computer Directive addressing copyright protection of certain aspects of computer software, i.e., user interfaces and program behavior that already have protection in the United States. See id.
at 280-81.
237
See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425,433 (7th Cir. 1993) (suggesting
that in the absence of a showing by the opponent that the antisuit injunction would in fact disturb the
foreign relations of the United States, the court should not allow "purely theoretical" international comity
objections to "trump a concrete and persuasive demonstration of harm to the applicant for the injunction").
us
See Altai Petition forCertiorari, supranote 48, at 15-16. See also Avramovich, supranote 199
(commenting on the possible evolution of international commerce into a "cybereconomy"); Walter A.
Effross, Contact Through Internet Sufficient for Jurisdictionover Nonresident: 6th Circuit Hands a
Victory to Compuserve, 13 COMPUTER L STRATEGIST 4, 5 (commenting on implications of the 6th
Circuit's ruling in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996), which found that a
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may welcome the opportunity to decline jurisdiction.2 39
The first-filed court would have the power to issue a foreign antisuit
injunction upon any party subject to its jurisdiction that would attempt to file
a duplicative claim in a foreign court controlled by substantially similar
law. 2" In effect, international comity would demand the issuance of the
injunction in order to avoid vexation upon the parties and the foreign court.U
Where the United States court finds the law is not substantially similar,
the parties would be able to continue the litigation abroad at the court's
discretion and attempt to apply the judgment of the court that reaches
judgment first as res judicata in the other fora. 2 While the United States
court would make the "substantially similar law" determination243 within its
equitable power to issue an antisuit injunction,'" the existence of a
multilateral judgment recognition convention on that particular area of law 24s
would further support the court's determination and increase the court's
adherence to international comity.
V. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of international comity ensures that foreign judicial and
legislative acts receive a level of deserved respect in the United States. The
exact level of respect that the United States federal courts should grant,
court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who makes primary contacts with a company
through the Internet); SEC Creates Office of Internet Enforcement to Battle Online Securities Fraud,
(visited Nov. 11,1998) <httpJ/www.sec.gov/news/press/98-69.txt>, at para. 3 (noting that the SEC receives
120 complaints per day concerning Internet-related securities fraud).
29
Baer, supra note 7, at 179 (commenting that foreign court may dismiss vexatious proceedings
on their own volition).
2Q
Cf. EC Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 65, art. 21 (providing that where proceedings
involving the same cause of action and parties are brought in different Member States, the first court to
obtain jurisdiction hears the case, and all other courts are bound to decline jurisdiction).
ul
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (emphasizing need for the courts to
determine the appropriate forum due to the "enormous commitment of judicial time and resources"); see
also Ginsburg, supra note 150, at 602 (arguing that United States courts should issue an antisuit injunction
in order to further the interest ofjudicial economy).
2
Cf. EC Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 65, art. 22 (allowing courts to stay their
proceedings or decline jurisdiction when the proceedings are related and so closely connected that it is
expedient to limit the litigation to one forum in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments from
separate proceedings).
243
See id., arts. 21-23.
2"
See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that United States federal courts have the equitable power to enjoin a foreign action by parties subject to
their jurisdiction).
25
See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a multilateral foreign
judgment convention, its benefits, and the difficulty of its ratification).
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however, is unclear. Equally unclear amongst the federal courts are the
standards by which a litigant may successfully move the court to trump
comity in order to protect the interests of the parties or the court. The
division in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals on the standards used
to issue foreign antisuit injunctions exemplifies this ambiguity. This division
affects international commerce by hindering the predictability of United
States courts for foreign parties and by failing to adequately protect the
interests of United States parties engaged in commerce abroad. As our nation
moves into a century of unprecedented international commerce and litigation,
it is imperative that the United States Supreme Court resolve the division in
favor of the liberal standard or, in the alternative, a flexible standard that
equitably regulates the doctrine of international comity with the interests of
United States business in order to ensure the competitiveness of United States
business for the next century.

